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Panel data framework has often been used to build Early Warning Systems for ﬁnancial crises. This paper
questions the implicit assumption that crises are homogenously caused by identical factors. It suggests a
preliminary step aiming at forming optimal country clusters.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The recent ﬁnancial turmoils have stimulated researchers in explain-
ing and predicting crises. As a consequence, academic literature on
ﬁnancial crises has soared. One of the ﬁrst to address the causes of a
ﬁnancial crisis were Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1998). Afterwards, the
literaturefocussedmoreondevelopingcountries(FrankelandRose,1996;
Sachs et al., 1996). Simultaneously, models to predict the occurrence of a
ﬁnancialcrisishavebeendeveloped.Theﬁrstidea,proposedbyKaminsky,
Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), involves building an Early Warning System
(EWS) using a signalling approach. They consider a large set of indicators
relating the external position, the ﬁnancial sector, the real sector, the
institutional structure and the ﬁscal policy of a particular country. When
these indicators cross a certain threshold, the model signals the
probability of a future ﬁnancial crisis. Berg and Pattillo (1999) show that
a simple probit-based model strongly outperforms the signal approach
and recommend the use of discrete choice techniques. The endogenous
variable (Ch,t) represents the occurrence of a crisis at most h-months
ahead. If a crisis occurs within the next h periods Ch,t takes a 1, other-
wise a 0.
1 Several major criticisms have been addressed to these models.
First, the results highly depend on the deﬁnition of the crisis. It is
clearthattheliteratureprovidesseveralmethodstodateﬁnancialcrises.
For example, the deﬁnition of the ﬁnancial crisis can be more strict or
less strict and can encompass only successful attacks or also unsuccess-
fulones.BussiereandFratzscher(2006)forexampleproposetoconsider
a post-crisis regime, such that the crisis variable takes a zero in tranquil
periods, a one before and during the crisis and a two for post-crisis
periods. This modiﬁcationis expected totacklethe problem of thepost-
crisis bias. Lestano et al. (2003) distinguish between currency crises,
banking crises and debt crises. They use 4 different crisis determinants
for currency crises and determine the banking and debt crises with the
help of IMF reports and central banks.
Second, as pointed out by Berg and Coke (2004),t h ea p p r o a c h
advocated by Berg and Pattillo (1999) results in artiﬁcial serially
correlated errors due to (i) the fact that often forecast horizons are
longer than the frequency at which the forecast is being updated, (ii) the
way the crises variable is constructed as a binary variable that takes the
value one for the periods [t − h, t − 1] when a crises occurs at time t.
Consequently,thestandarderrorswillbebiased.Thisaffectsallinferences
unless a robust HAC covariance matrix or bootstrap method is used.
Third, several studies (in particular Kumar et al., 2003)h a v e
noticed that crisis events are less frequent than non-crisis ones.
Indeed, the probit model is not adequate to model events that are in
the tail of a distribution, and a logit model has to be preferred.
Fourth, seminal EWSs such as Berg and Pattillo (1999) exclusively
focus on individual countries. Recent papers however (inter alii,
Shortland, 2004; Fuertes and Kalotychou, 2007 and Kumar et al.,
2003), have considered the possibility of adopting a panel data
framework where data for several countries are pooled. Such an
extension is mainly motivated byan efﬁciencyargument since pooling
countriesincreases the numberof useful observationsand is supposed
to lead to a gain in accuracy when estimating the underlying discrete
choice models. A crucial untested assumption however is the
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samefactors are supposed to explain adequately ﬁnancial crises, but also
that the parameters may be assumed constant and homogenous across
the cross section dimension. Under these restrictive assumptions,
heterogeneity may then simply be captured by ﬁxed effects and all
other features of the models may be assumed to be common to all the
countries in the panel and the data can be pooled for estimation and
inference. This contradicts nevertheless two well-known features of
ﬁnancial crises: First, not all crisis are the consequences of macro-
economic fundamentals, but they might also be driven by psychological
f a c t o r sa st h es e l f - f u l ﬁlling prophecy or by a weak bank balance sheet.
Second, the recent literature has shown that spill-over effects are
importantdeterminantsinthetransmissionofaﬁnancial crisis, meaning
that “ground-zero” countries are ﬁrst hit and then transmit the turmoil,
leading to strong, possibly dynamic cross-sectional dependence. Aggre-
gating and pooling these countries might not only lead to a loss of
information but could also severely affect the estimation and inferences.
This paper proposes a deeper analysis of the panel-logit model as
EWS. We focus exclusively on the poolability issue. We show that
emergingmarketforecastersshouldnotnaivelypoolallthedataavailable
foramaximumnumberofcountries,becausethequalityoftheprediction
would seriously decrease. We advise them to perform a preliminary
analysis of optimal country clusters before setting up the panel-logit
model. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the competing
models (full, regional, cluster and individual) are presented. In Section 3,
the ability of these models to predict ﬁn a n c i a lc r i s e si si n v e s t i g a t e d .
2. The empirical models
Four different models are investigated. The ﬁrst one, called ”Naive
Model” (NM) integrates all the countries and all the data available in a
pooled panel-logit framework. The second model, called ”Regional
Model” (RM), only integrates countries in the same geographical region.
Insuchacase,itisassumedthatﬁnancialcrisiswillaffectallthecountries
lying in the same region similarly and simultaneously. The third model,
called ”Cluster Model” (CM) only includes countries which can be
statistically pooled. In order to determine these clusters of countries, we
follow the iterative approach of Kapetanios (2003).I naﬁrst step, the
”Naive Model” is estimated and the poolability tested via a traditional
Hausman test. If this test rejects the null hypothesis of poolability, the
country, whose contribution to the Hausman statistics is the highest is
excluded in a second step. The group of countries is reduced until the
poolabilityisnomorerejected.Thefourthmodel,called”Countrymodel”
(CoM) is the logit model estimated for each individual country and
constitutesa benchmark.With the exception of the”Country Model”,w e
encounter a panel-logit model, particular attention is devoted to the
correct speciﬁcation of country-speciﬁc terms, which can be ﬁxed or
random. Hausman tests are performed to ensure a correct speciﬁcation.
2
2.1. Data, crisis indicator and performance indicators
The dataset covers 13 countries
3 from South America and South-
East Asia. Data are at monthly frequency, adjusted for seasonality and
run from January 1985 to December 2004. They are obtained via
Datastream. The sources used are the IMF-IFS database and the
national banks of the respective countries. Explanatory variables
correspond to those used in Kumar et al. (2003) They are the 1-year
growth rate of International Reserves, Imports, Exports, M2 Multi-
plier, Domestic Credit over GDP, Real Bank Deposits, M2 to Reserves
and Industrial Production, as well as the levels of the ratio M2 to
Reserves, the Real Interest Rate and the ratio Lending Rate over
Deposit Rate. Following Kumar et al. (2003), we reduce the impact of
extreme values by dampening every variable via the transformation
yt
New = (sign of yt) ⁎ ln(1 + |yt|).
The periods of crisis are determined via the Exchange Market
Pressure Index (EMPI) (see Eichengreen et al., 1995). This EMPI is the
weighted average between the 6-month change in the exchange rate
withrespect tothe US dollarand(the negative of) the6-monthchange
in the international reserves where the weights are chosen such that
the variance of the two factors are equal. The sample is split into high
inﬂation periods and low inﬂation periods, because volatility is
typically higher in periods of high inﬂation. The cutoff point is when
the 6-month inﬂation is more than 50%. For both subsamples, a crisis
is signalled when the EMPI exceeds the threshold of the mean plus
two times standard deviation.
In order to assess the respective quality of each of the four models
in consideration, three traditional in-sample goodness-of-ﬁt indica-



























where T is the sample size, Pt is the ﬁtted crisis probability, A is the
number of correctly predicted crises, B counts the number of false
2 Models are estimated by Newton Raphson's Maximum Likelihood using Stata 9.0
software.
3 In South America: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. In
South-East Asia: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand.
Table 1
In-sample performance of the empirical models
Optimal cluster Goodness
of ﬁt
NM RM CM CoM
QPS 0.2543 0.2424 0.2228 0.1669
Argentina Brazil, Peru LPS −0.3962 −0.3760 −0.3452 −0.2626
KS 0.4075 0.4414 0.4731 0.6654
QPS 0.3388 0.3934 0.2987 0.2348
Brazil Argentina, Peru LPS −0.5581 −0.5859 −0.4700 −0.3858
KS 0.4095 0.2823 0.4390 0.5675
QPS 0.2693 0.2604 0.2664 0.0605
Mexico Uruguay, Venezuela LPS −0.4669 −0.4222 −0.4094 −0.1039
KS 0.5228 0.5443 0.5138 0.9220
QPS 0.2082 0.1823 0.1282 0.0974
Peru Argentina, Brazil LPS −0.3451 −0.3166 −0.2759 −0.1731
KS 0.6947 0.7886 0.8202 0.9050
QPS 0.3475 0.3675 0.1986 0.0996
Uruguay Mexico, Venezuela LPS −0.5535 −0.5727 −0.3198 −0.1583
KS 0.3631 0.3329 0.6334 0.8393
QPS 0.3724 0.3399 0.2861 0.1675
Venezuela Mexico, Uruguay LPS −0.5419 −0.5096 −0.4407 −0.2537
KS 0.3872 0.4604 0.5154 0.7574
QPS 0.2935 0.2103 0.1330 0.1106
Indonesia Korea LPS −0.4567 −0.3241 −0.2093 −0.1736
KS 0.2412 0.6884 0.7297 0.7529
QPS 0.1890 0.1583 0.1184 0.0342
Korea Indonesia LPS −0.3197 −0.2542 −0.1834 −0.0661
KS 0.1795 0.6496 0.6347 0.9295
QPS 0.1871 0.0994 0.0463 0.0234
Malaysia Taiwan, Thailand LPS −0.2961 −0.1750 −0.0796 −0.0367
KS 0.4479 0.8113 0.9032 0.9415
QPS 0.3771 0.2808 0.1004 0.1004
Philippines (none) LPS −0.5620 −0.4308 −0.1729 −0.1729
KS −0.0347 0.4019 0.8214 0.8214
QPS 0.1642 0.0593 0.0734 –
Taiwan
a Malaysia, Thailand LPS −0.2640 −0.0936 −0.1186 –
KS 0.3282 0.9234 0.8665 –
QPS 0.1881 0.2124 0.1181 –
Thailand
a Malaysia, Taiwan LPS −0.3046 −0.3246 −0.1809 –
KS 0.3961 0.3879 0.7023 –
a The single-country models of both Taiwan and Thailand result in a perfect ﬁt due to
collinearity between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables. For this
reason they are removed from the table.




































82 J. van den Berg et al. / Economics Letters 101 (2008) 80–83alarms, 0 are the missed crises and D stands for the correctly predicted
tranquil periods. It is straightforward to notice that the quality of a
model increases as QPS and LPS move close to 0, and KS approaches 1.
3. The results
In all cases a panel-logit model with ﬁxed effect is supported by
Hausman tests.
4 In Table 1 we present for each country the optimal
cluster, obtained via the Kapetanios recursive procedure as well as the
performance of each empirical model in terms of within-sample
goodness-of-ﬁt. To evaluate the forecasting capabilities of the models,
one might argue that out-of-sample estimations are needed. Inoue
and Kilian (2006) show however, that within-sample and out-of-
sample performance is strongly related. Therefore it is sufﬁcient to
evaluate only the within-sample performance.
Unsurprisingly, it turns out that the optimal clusters are smaller
than the whole set of countries, but also smaller than the set of
countries located in the same region. It means that pooling the data,
even byregion, is rejected by Hausman's test.Economically, it signiﬁes
that the factors explaining the recent crises are generally not identical
across the countries. Four optimal clusters are found: a) Argentina,
Brazil and Peru, b) Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, c) Indonesia and
Korea and d) Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. These clusters turn out to
be very reasonable from an economic point of view. Argentina, Brazil
and Peru were in the late 80's characterized by hyper inﬂation (Kiguel
and Liviatan, 1995). Financial crises match then these periods of
extreme inﬂation rates and end with the stabilization plans estab-
lished in the early 90's. Inﬂation is then the fundamental underlying
variablewhich hasaffected theEWSin thiscluster. The cluster Mexico,
Uruguay, Venezuela seems to have less economic basis, even if similar
privatisation reforms have been experienced by Uruguay and
Venezuela in the early 90s (McCoy et al., 1998). On the contrary, the
occurrenceof theAsiancrisis(the onlyonewhichhasbeen detected in
our sample for most of the Asian countries) in both Indonesia and
Korea is similar and has been driven by excessive borrowing and risk
taking (see Evrensel and Kutan, 2006) leading to the moral hazard
problem (Haggard and MacIntyre, 2001). With respect to the cluster,
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand the structural similarity around the
Asian crisis is straightforward. As they were characterized by poor
institutional local ﬁnancial markets, the decrease in the returns on
investments has forced these countries to an increase in short-term
foreign exchange borrowing (Claessens et al., 1999; Kuo, 2001). This
outcome is also supported bythe goodness-of-ﬁt indicators where it is
possible to see that the CM model almost always outperforms NM and
RM. Even if the CoM model still performs slightly better than the CM
in termof in-sample prediction, the gain due tothe higher precision of
the estimator might be justiﬁed in this case. To illustrate the
predicting power of each of the models, the predicted probability of
a ﬁnancial crisis is plotted in Fig. 1. The results outlined by the
goodness-of-ﬁt indicators are conﬁrmed. Nevertheless it turns out
that the loss due to the use of panel-logit model is particularly large
for Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
To conclude, this paper suggests that crisis forecasters should not
naively poolall the dataavailable fora maximumnumberof countries,
because the quality of the prediction would seriously decrease. We
advise them to perform a preliminary analysis of optimal country
clusters before setting up the panel-logit model.
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